African Agency in a Changing Security Environment: Sources, Opportunities and Challenges by Hammerstad, Anne
This article was downloaded by: [Anne Hammerstad]
On: 06 November 2013, At: 23:25
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Conflict, Security & Development
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ccsd20
African agency in a changing security
environment: sources, opportunities
and challenges
Danielle Beswick & Anne Hammerstad
Published online: 04 Nov 2013.
To cite this article: Danielle Beswick & Anne Hammerstad , Conflict, Security & Development
(2013): African agency in a changing security environment: sources, opportunities and challenges,
Conflict, Security & Development, DOI: 10.1080/14678802.2013.849470
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2013.849470
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the
“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,
our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to
the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions
and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,
and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content
should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources
of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,
proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever
or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or
arising out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &
Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-
and-conditions
Conflict, Security & Development, 2013 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2013.849470 
Introduction 
African agency in a changing 
security environment: sources, 
opportunities and challenges 
Danielle Beswick and Anne Hammerstad 
Introduction 
To what extent do structural factors limit actors’ ability to make choices and effect changes 
to their social, economic or political environments? The structure-versus-agency question 
is central to all disciplines of social science research, whether sociology, politics or 
international relations (IR), but the answers provided vary widely both within and 
between disciplines. One of the ways in which IR traditionally distinguished itself from 
sociology and politics was its stronger tendency towards structural explanations of 
behaviour. Whether of a realist, liberal or dependency hue, IR theorists would argue that 
international politics is an arena of limited agency, and particularly so for the vast majority 
of state (and other) actors that are not classified as great powers. 
Strongly structuralist theories have declined but not disappeared from IR since their 
heyday in the 1970s and 1980s. The discipline’s constructivist turn, starting in the 1990s 
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2 Danielle Beswick and Anne Hammerstad 
and influenced by sociologists such as Anthony Giddens,1 allowed the structure-agency 
debate in IR to move away from an either-or perspective to one in which actors are both 
constrained by and constitutive of (hence at least potentially able to modify) the structures 
within which they live and operate. But structurally inclined explanations have lingered 
longer in the study of Africa’s and Africans’ role in global politics than in most other areas 
of IR research. 
Although the literature on African agency is growing, it remains the case that IR 
scholarship on Africa tends to concern itself with the way in which marginalised, poor and 
weak African countries are acted and impacted upon by great powers and international 
institutions.2 Taking the example of conflict analysis, the influential ‘new wars’ literature 
initiated by Kaldor focused on outside forces, in collusion with local war-profiting elites, 
working to perpetuate conflict, war economies and underdevelopment in war-torn regions 
of the world, Africa prominent among them.3 From this conflict perspective, local/ 
national level agency is a mostly negative concept: the ability of a small local elite to collude 
in globally-driven processes that are perpetuating conflict and poverty at local levels. 
This special issue contributes to the growing debate on the nature and limits of African 
agency. It does so by focusing on the possibilities of and constraints on agency in the 
security sphere. This is a sphere traditionally characterised as dominated by existential 
threats and the imperative of survival. Hence it is often considered to present an especially 
restrictive environment for agency, particularly of the transformative kind. We do not take 
this traditional understanding of security for granted, but adopt a constructivist 
viewpoint. The articles included in this special issue have in common that they all aim to 
critically explore the way in which security threats and appropriate responses are 
perceived, defined and pursued by African actors, whether multilateral institutions, states, 
communities or individuals. 
We argue in favour of an understanding of agency which is relational and 
contextualised, where structures and agency are continuously reproduced over time and 
co-constitutive, a theme reflected across the studies presented. Through this approach we 
aim to challenge narrow, structure-dominated and overly restrictive approaches to 
understanding the responses of African actors to contemporary security challenges. 
We define security in a broad manner. Some studies are concerned with traditional 
security threats to states and regions, while others focus on the human security needs of 
individuals to not just survive on the margins of existence but to exercise their agency to 


























3 African agency in a changing security environment 
rich and varied source for reflecting on the possibilities, constraints and implications of 
African agency in a dynamic security environment. 
The special issue takes a bottom-up approach to the debate on African agency. It does so 
in two ways. First, rather than start with the theoretical structure/agency debate, it uses 
theoretically informed empirical studies to further our understanding of how African 
agency takes shape in specific conditions and under particular constraints. The existence 
(or not) and nature of agency is not assumed, but explored through rich empirical 
analysis. Second, the articles of this special issue do not take for granted that agency is 
something that only pertains to elites. Three of the contributors explore the possibilities 
for agency owned by those on the bottom rungs of power hierarchies within African states. 
Can the survival tactics and dreams of Somali refugee women in Nairobi or unemployed 
former child soldiers in Liberia be described as agency? And what do we gain in our 
understanding from studying such marginalised groups from an agency perspective? The 
answers provided in this special issue are sobering, in that they highlight the intrinsic 
relationship between power and agency. Crudely put, the more power an individual or 
institutional actor enjoys, or can tap into, in a particular setting (whether soft, relational, 
or hard, material) the greater the chance that the actor is able to display agency that is 
more than tactical short-term decisions about day-to-day survival. 
Africa’s changing security environment 
2013 marks the 50th anniversary of the creation of the Organisation of African Unity, and 
2012 saw the 10th anniversary of its successor the African Union (AU). Scholars have used 
these milestones to reflect on Africa’s position in the world following a half-century of 
independence, to consider the impact of African institutions, including the emerging 
peace and security architecture, and to explore the contemporary security challenges 
facing Africa.4 In such reviews a number of key trends are noted. These form an important 
backdrop for our discussion of African agency in the security arena. 
First, analysts have highlighted the growth of multilateral institutions in Africa, at both 
continental and regional level. The establishment of the AU and development of an African 
Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) has transformed the institutional landscape of 
African conflict prevention and management.5 While the APSA structures remain weak 


























4 Danielle Beswick and Anne Hammerstad 
African involvement and leadership on matters of conflict and insecurity on the continent. 
The development of the APSA structures reflects in part the interests of external actors 
who do not wish to provide peacekeeping forces for missions in Africa, preferring instead 
to fund and ‘build capacity’ of African actors to enable them to provide African solutions 
to Africa’s security problems. 
This ‘African solutions’ narrative could thus be interpreted as primarily benefitting 
external actors. But it has also been seized upon by many African actors keen to take 
greater ownership of security on the continent and to access the military training, 
capacity-building and resources offered to key African security partners. The EU launched 
its African Peace Facility (APF) in 2003 to fund African-led security efforts—both 
institution-building and peacekeeping missions. Between 2003 and 2010, e740 million was 
channelled to African security actors and institutions through the APF alone. Such 
funding flows have allowed states considered lynchpins in regional security, including 
Nigeria, South Africa and a range of states in East Africa, to benefit from the ‘African 
Solutions’ mantra, though the long-term security implications of large international 
investments in national military capacity-building are as yet unclear.7 
The AU has, alone or in concert with the UN and with substantial financial support 
from the EU now fielded peace support missions in Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia and 
Burundi, demonstrating political will and growing capacity despite relying on external 
funding and suffering significant resource, equipment, logistical and other challenges.8 
It has also sought to play a role in conflict prevention and non-military responses. The 
process of the OAU’s and AU’s gradual and sometimes painful learning experience in 
conflict mediation is documented in this issue by Tieku’s careful analysis of the Burundi 
peace process. 
Secondly, patterns of armed conflict in Africa have changed considerably since the end 
of the Cold War. Despite the popular media image of Africa as a continent wracked by 
violent conflict, studies show that the global trend of a significant decline in the number of 
civil and inter-state wars is also reflected in Africa.9 Straus’ review of armed conflict data 
for Africa suggests that such conflicts have been replaced by a growth in low-level 
insurgencies which, though ‘in some cases capable of sowing terror and disruption[,] [...] 
tend to be small in size, internally divided, poorly structured and trained, and without 
access to heavy weapons’.10 Such actors nevertheless present significant challenges to the 
security forces and citizens of the states in which they operate, as well as for the African 


























5 African agency in a changing security environment 
are unable or unwilling to meet the demands or grievances of such groups, nor to 
decisively defeat them militarily. 
The operation of such groups across state borders has fuelled regional insecurity and 
tensions, perhaps most notably and with most deadly consequences in central Africa.11 
Though the quantity and qualitative nature of conflict in Africa may have changed, 
significant security challenges, both physical and human, remain an everyday reality for 
citizens of many African states. The civil wars and other forms of violent conflict that 
remain a feature of African security, continue to result in death, injury, uncertainty and 
displacement, generating security challenges for national security forces, local 
communities, neighbouring states and displaced individuals.12 
Third, over the past two decades there has been an increased emphasis, by the 
international community and development actors in particular, on human security. 
A focus on humans as the referent object of security suggests the need to consider different 
kinds of security threats to those which have dominated traditional IR, and to explore a 
wider array of tools and the involvement of a greater range of actors in tackling such 
threats. In a broad reading of this concept, security threats could include conditions 
prevalent in many states in sub-Saharan Africa, including unemployment, limited access 
to healthcare and education, displacement and discrimination based on factors including 
gender or disability. Sceptics point out that defining security in such a way could render it 
less useful as a concept and basis for action.13 
While having been labelled both conceptually flawed and a stalled policy initiative,14 
human security has nevertheless retained an important role as a signpost and political 
rallying cry that security should be more than the study of states and their regimes. The AU 
and its funding partners have also acknowledged that the last decades’ investment in 
Africa’s security architecture has predominately been channelled to traditional security 
structures, particularly military missions, while ‘there are a number of security and related 
developments that do not fall within the remit of any of the APSA components [including] 
terrorism, piracy, disaster management, post-conflict reconstruction and broader 
governance issues’.15 
The intention to view security differently in the case of developing states and regions, 
though in perhaps more varied ways, is reflected in a fourth and final trend. 
As Abrahamsen noted almost a decade ago, Africa has become ‘securitised’, labelled by 
high-profile politicians, public figures and media in many donor states and at 


























6 Danielle Beswick and Anne Hammerstad 
however unique to Africa. More broadly, there has been a shift in thinking on development 
by many of the major bilateral and multilateral donors, leading them to the conclusion 
that successful development requires an environment of peace and security.17 This means 
that conflict and insecurity on the continent, even in the form of low-level insurgencies, 
cannot be easily ignored by donors. This discourse has also seen a whole range of 
marginalised and potentially highly-vulnerable groups, including refugees, former 
combatants and unemployed youth identified as potential security threats.18 
The positing of a ‘security-development nexus’ has precipitated a renewed focus on 
building capacity for African solutions, but has also led to an increase in efforts by some 
donors, notably OECD DAC states and some multilateral donors, to support and promote 
state-building.19 Such efforts are often aimed at developing states able to withstand shocks, 
whether economic or political. However there are potential tensions between building 
states which are politically stable, resilient and able to contribute to African peace and 
security, whilst also promoting political settlements within them which are inclusive, 
representative and responsive to citizens’ needs, including those relating to security. 
As Africa passes this half-century milestone the implications of these trends for peace and 
security continue to play out in the lives of individuals and communities as well as in the 
practices and interactions of African states and institutions. 
Why agency? 
In seeking to understand how African actors are navigating the contemporary security 
environment, we focus on agency because of its perhaps unique capacity, noted by de 
Bruijn, van Dijk and Gewald, to ‘explode often victimizing approaches in exchange for a 
much more balanced understanding of the local processes at work in Africa’.20 A focus on 
agency allows us ‘to challenge narratives of Africa that present the entire continent as 
perpetual victim and lacking political initiative’.21 It is, in this sense, a rejoinder to 
accounts of African actors which depict their actions as shaped solely by outside actors and 
discourses over which they have little or no control. 
This does not imply that we ignore or seek to minimise the very real constraints faced by 
African actors in exercising agency, whether the agents in question are state representatives 
operating at the international level or individuals seeking to increase their security in the 


























7 African agency in a changing security environment 
explore how African actors navigate this arena of constraints and opportunities, 
considering who acts, how and with what effects.22 These processes, making active choices 
even where options are limited, and seeking to improve options in future decision-making 
by accumulating experience and building up resources and repertories, are key themes of 
the papers in this collection. 
Hurt reminds us that between the two poles of the debate on African agency—those 
who see a significant improvement in African agency evidenced by increased African 
activism on the global stage, and those who counter that Africa remains marginalised and 
that the agency of its actors is entirely structurally determined—there is a middle ground. 
In his view, ‘structures (both ideational and material) are seen as placing limitations on 
[African actors], but these outcomes are not predetermined’.23 In the cases discussed in 
this special issue, the agency demonstrated by African actors is a product of their 
interactions with others actors and with structures and processes, both within and outside 
Africa. In this sense agency is both relational and dynamic. 
In adopting this relational understanding of agency, we draw on Brown’s work on 
African agency in international politics, whereby he argues: ‘a flexible conceptualisation of 
agency is needed to locate agencies in the “complex dialectical interplay” with the 
structural contexts from which they arise and in relation to which they operate’.24 Thus, 
despite myriad challenges and limitations, African actors, whether states, regional 
organisations, civil society organisations, communities or individuals, are far from passive 
subjects or voiceless victims of the new security environment. Structures are important, 
but though they can condition the world of possibilities for African actors, we cannot 
know exactly how an actor will behave solely by examining the structural dynamics of a 
given situation. Recognising this, each author in this special issue, in their own way, 
explores how agency is found and maximised by African actors despite, or in some cases 
because of, their perceived weaknesses or lack of capacity. 
Agency in the security arena 
Attempts to enhance agency despite constraints of capacity and external power structures 
are perhaps most obvious in the use of collective action and multilateral fora by African 
states. This is reflected in the development of regional security mechanisms over the past 


























8 Danielle Beswick and Anne Hammerstad 
predecessor in African peace and security.25 The AU tries to use its role representing 
54 African states to project a pre-eminent African voice on international security matters 
relating to Africa, including conflict prevention, management and peacekeeping. This 
mirrors the efforts of African states elsewhere, such as at the World Trade Organisation, to 
act as a bloc and make Africa’s numbers count on the international stage.26 
By working collectively, including developing common positions on crises and 
frameworks for enhancing the emergent African peace and security architecture, African 
states can present a considerable bloc in international fora and debates on peace and 
security. Capacity constraints, which have hampered the ability of African actors to 
respond to security crises on the continent in the past, can also be partially overcome by 
joint and hybrid initiatives between African states and with outside partners. 
The transition in African Union operations in Sudan to include a hybrid UN–AU 
Mission in Darfur is evidence of this potential but also demonstrates some of the 
limitations. This is explored in detail by Mickler’s piece in this collection. 
Perceived and actual weaknesses and limitations of capacity can however also be used as 
a resource by African actors to enhance their agency and to attract external support, 
including in the security arena.27 At the level of state representatives and African 
governments, this strategy was captured in Bayart’s notion of ‘extraversion’ two decades 
ago, in which he argued: 
Far from being the victims of their very real vulnerability, African governments 
exploit, occasionally skilfully, the resources of a dependence which is, it cannot 
ever be sufficiently stressed, astutely fabricated as much as predetermined. Both 
on their political stage and within the world system, they pursue their own 
objectives, within the margins of failure and success that the implementation of 
any strategy entails.28 
This highlights the potential for African actors to frame their interactions with the rest of 
the world by exploiting their own dependence and the features that external actors often 
identify with them—including political and economic fragility and limited capacity. This 
is particularly relevant for the security arena, in which, as discussed earlier, ‘Africa’ and 
processes and characteristics associated with African underdevelopment, such as insecure 
borders and ungoverned spaces, have become considered threats to both African and 
international peace and security.29 This contradicts Brown’s suggestion that: ‘[i]n the area 


























9 African agency in a changing security environment 
by the involvement of outside powers and the limits of African military and political 
capacity’.30 
Discourses which seek to link underdevelopment and insecurity may posit Africa as a 
source of security threats, but they have also underlined a sense of urgency in the drive by 
outside actors to support African peace and security capacity development: to provide 
African solutions to African problems. Whether security problems in Africa are indeed 
solely ‘African’ in cause or consequence is highly debateable, particularly given the 
networked and globalised character of many conflict economies in the region. 
Nevertheless, the emphasis on African solutions provides opportunities for some African 
states to stress their value as partners in African peace and security initiatives, attracting 
support to reinforce such roles. 
Thus, reflecting Bayart’s analysis, African elites are able to use conceptions that others 
have of African actors’ weaknesses and dependencies in order to garner support and 
resources to pursue their own objectives. These, according to Bayart, follow a historically 
grounded trajectory which is independent of, but interacts with, external influences. This 
chimes with Brown’s more recent analysis of African agency, which suggests that examples 
of agency need to be situated ‘within a “thicker” historical account’.31 Papers in this 
collection seek to provide this thicker account by situating particular initiatives by African 
actors, including involvement in conflict mediation and peacekeeping, in a wider context, 
making links to past experiences as well as contemporary narratives on African peace and 
security. 
Developing this further it is clear that, despite the power and resource asymmetries that 
African actors face in their encounters with others in the new security environment, agency 
is not simply a synonym for resistance or opposition to those structures and processes. 
Instead, agency can be exercised in ways which challenge, support or even alter structures. 
The establishment of the AU, with its constitutive act departing significantly from that of 
its predecessor and the advent of the Peace and Security Council, could be considered such 
an act. It fundamentally altered the environment within which discussions of peace and 
conflict management in Africa occur, providing a new reference point for discussions, a 
new collective African voice in international debate and a focal point for international 
efforts to develop the capacity of African actors to manage peace and security on the 
continent.32 
This is not to say that there is always agreement between AU members on crises or 


























10 Danielle Beswick and Anne Hammerstad 
positions on specific issues and the institution has been used as a platform to play out 
inter-state rivalries,33 but the existence of the AU and its determination to ‘speak for 
Africa’ on matters of peace and security have altered the institutional landscape of African 
peace and security. The exercise of agency by African actors in this arena can therefore 
challenge existing structures which influence decision-making of African and external 
actors. Thus, in exploring agency, as Brown argues, we must be mindful that ‘agency needs 
to be seen as both creative and reproductive of existing structural relationships, as well as, 
potentially at least, transformative of them’.34 
Levels of analysis: whose agency? 
So far we have mostly discussed African agency in progressive terms, as a story of African 
actors’ ability to carve out a more autonomous and active role in the continent’s security 
politics, even in the face of global power and resource asymmetries. But until now we have 
mainly discussed ‘African agency’ as if it belongs to a narrow elite of state actors: those 
wielding political power within and on behalf of sovereign African states. 
The state and international levels are clearly important in a debate on African agency. As 
Brown argues, sovereignty adds a crucial dimension to the discussion of African agency. 
Sovereignty bounds agency by delineating an action as being that of the state, or an 
authorised representative of it, and this lends a degree of legitimacy and authenticity to the 
action. Thus: ‘not only does sovereignty serve to maintain the inside/outside distinction, it 
is also the principle through which states themselves perform their agency, exert power, 
and play roles internationally enacted by their agents’.35 This legitimacy may derive from 
the state’s claim to represent the interests of its people, on the basis of collective identity or 
by virtue of the state having undergone a process to authorise those in power, such as 
democratic elections.36 
The assumption of African actors wielding real agency—making decisions 
based on their own imagination and perceptions of aims and interests—is therefore 
particularly valid when studying state elites. This is despite the complication created by 
the fragility and institutional weaknesses of many African states. Whether they can be said 
to have ‘acted’ in a particular context may be dependent, in large part, on how their state-
ness (authority to authorise and perform agency as a state actor) is viewed and represented 


























African agency in a changing security environment 11 
relatively stable institutions, able to continuously reproduce patterns of authority and 
control, still represent a complex assemblage rather than a single unitary actor.38 
In this collection, Fisher’s account engages with this debate by highlighting the complex 
interplay between the actions of leaders, regimes and states in East Africa and the ways 
these are perceived and categorised as agency by both the actors themselves and external 
powers. In the security arena African states are therefore important and complex actors to 
consider when seeking to understand how the agency of African state elites may be 
exercised, constrained, captured, portrayed and given meaning by actors within the 
international system. 
State elites do generally possess a larger repertoire of agency than other African actors. 
As such a division between state and non-state actors is necessary when analysing African 
agency. In the case of African states’ foreign and security policy elites, their potential for 
transformative agency—agency that changes the boundaries of ‘what can be done’—is not 
hypothetical: it can be seen in processes such as the creation and development of the AU. 
But what about groups and individuals lower down the ladder of politics and power in 
African societies? Considering that agency is ‘bound up with power, politics and the social 
hierarchies they produce’,39 to what extent can poor and marginalised groups and 
individuals be said to exercise agency in a meaningful way? 
Discussions of African agency cannot leave the question of whose agency unanswered. In 
International Relations terms, this can be framed as a question of levels of analysis. The 
articles in this special issue encompass perspectives ranging from the international to the 
individual level. Three of the articles (by Fisher, Mickler and Tieku) focus on the state level 
(foreign and security policy, including conflict mediation strategies), coupled with the 
regional or international level of relations between states. This is the traditional focus of IR 
literature on African agency: the extent to which African political elites are actors on the 
world stage, or passive observers in—or even missing from—the political fora in which 
decisions affecting their countries are being made. 
Assumptions are generally more modest and restrictive when studying the 
possibilities of, and constraints on, agency in the case of groups and individuals who 
occupy the lower rungs of social hierarchies and who have few if any access points to 
political power structures—be they local or national ones. Three of the articles in this 
special issue are concerned with the severe limitations of agency experienced by 
such groups. Perera focuses on the Rwandan Hutu militia in DR Congo, the FDLR. 


























12 Danielle Beswick and Anne Hammerstad 
securitised contributes to the groups’ construction and maintenance of a victimhood 
identity, and reinforces its limited and destructive repertoire of violence and 
coercion in its interactions with local host communities and Congolese and Rwandan 
authorities. 
Thomson and Bøa˚s in their contributions both focus on groups at a much looser level of 
organisation. They focus on the ‘survival agency’ of some of the poorest, most vulnerable 
and marginalised of African actors, such as young unmarried Somali refugee women 
navigating the dangers of Nairobi, former child soldiers in Liberia, young diamond miners 
in Sierra Leone and youth from across West Africa who hazard the crossing of the Sahara 
and the Mediterranean in a bid to reach Europe, a mythical paradise of social, not just 
geographical, mobility. 
Sideways mobility and survival agency 
De Bruijn, van Dijk and Gewald argue that ‘[n]o easy assumption can be made about what 
agency is or about whose hands it is vested in. This can only be demonstrated through 
detailed empirical research and can never be assumed or taken for granted’.40 The articles 
that make up this special issue are testament to this. There are significant differences in the 
kinds, and effects, of agency exercised by the different actors discussed, as well as in the 
analytical tools and methodological approaches which are employed to examine agency of 
actors at these different levels. Ethnographic methods are prevalent in the studies of 
individual agency, seeking to understand how individuals in highly constrained 
circumstances perceive and exercise their agency in relation to the worlds they inhabit, 
and to consider the meanings they ascribe to their actions, which may be radically different 
to those posited by outsiders. 
In the three studies of individuals and marginalised groups presented here, focused on 
urban refugee women in Kenya, youth groups in Liberia, Sierra Leone and northern Mali, 
and Rwandan ‘warrior refugees’ in North Kivu, the authors challenge assumptions about 
agency which are often attached to labels associated with those they research. Ethnography, 
in this regard, is an ideal approach when combined with an analytical focus on agency. It 
encourages a focus on how individuals make sense of their circumstances and make 
decisions affecting their security, including their exposure to risk of immediate and future 


























African agency in a changing security environment 13 
These studies bring a new perspective by moving away from a view of Somali refugee 
women as powerless victims in Nairobi, or underemployed Sierra Leonean youth and 
Rwandan refugees in Congo as only potential or actual security threats. The studies, to 
different degrees, do consider how others have depicted, and often securitised, these 
groups and the ways this affects their options. However, despite, and in the case of the 
FDLR perhaps because of, powerful discourses at the international level and structural 
factors which work to exclude and marginalise these groups at the local level, the authors 
show how greater room for manoeuvre and the exercise of a degree of control over 
personal circumstances can be achieved—even in the face of extreme constraints of 
poverty, exclusion and marginalisation. 
Bøa˚s and Thomson’s studies do, however, pose a challenge to this rather optimistic 
account of agency as, at least potential, empowerment for the marginalised and weak. 
Both studies describe agency that is primarily geared towards survival, not 
transformation. In Thomson’s detailed depiction of the lives of young Somali refugee 
women, she argues that these women’s silence and efforts to make themselves invisible 
should be considered a form of agency. This suggestion that inaction and silence should 
be considered an active choice, equal to that of speaking or acting out, is not new. 
However, when considering how agency is found and exercised by individuals in highly 
constrained circumstances, particularly where the choice of silence, or making the 
dangerous journey from a home community to a mythical ‘better life’ in the North, is 
contrasted with the very real possibility of a life limited by poverty, structural—and 
direct physical—violence, there remains a question as to whether such choices should be 
considered a demonstration of agency at all. 
Bøa˚s recounts the many ingenious ways in which West African youth from the least 
auspicious of backgrounds dream and plan for a future of upward mobility, economic 
success and social recognition, whether by attaching themselves to ‘big men’, searching for 
the big diamond, or risking their lives crossing deserts and oceans (if they get that far) to 
make it big in the developed world. But despite this ingenuity, and the desperation with 
which such plans are acted on, such agency is seldom transformative. For the vast majority 
the mobility is sideways, not upwards: the plans and dreams may sustain survival but not 
prosperity. 
In conclusion, focusing the analytical lens on agency yields illuminating insights into 
the complexities of sub-Saharan Africa’s evolving security landscape. On the one hand, 


























14 Danielle Beswick and Anne Hammerstad 
security policy elite gaining in confidence, experience, power and autonomy, at least in 
issue areas relating to the continent’s conflicts and security challenges. ‘African solutions 
for Africa’s problems’ has certainly become a somewhat tired slogan and one 
which downplays the African security architecture’s many weaknesses, including its 
continued reliance on external funding. Nevertheless, despite these challenges, and 
reflecting its value for state security and foreign policy elites, the slogan is perhaps more 
of a reality than most commentators had expected at the launch of the African Union in 
2002. 
At the level of individual agency the conclusions are more sobering. The articles 
collected here provide little evidence that increased assertiveness among state elites is 
somehow ‘trickling down’ to the many African citizens whose energy, effort and talents 
remain channelled into survival agency by the seemingly insurmountable structures that 
continue to hem in their lives and their options. 
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